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(U) Czech Mates?

FROM:

FAD's Central/Eastern European Office (DP13)

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NSA explores cooperation with Czech SIGINT'ers (S//SI)

(S//SI) NSA's first formal delegation to meet with leaders of the Czech Republic's *External Intelligence Service* (UZSI) returned from Prague in early February with a wealth of information about UZSI's organization and SIGINT operations. This information has been shared throughout SID and will be the basis on which NSA does or does not pursue a Third Party relationship with the Czech Republic. Although UZSI has a relatively small SIGINT organization, their SIGINT professionals display overall levels of sophistication, knowledge, practical experience, ingenuity and enthusiasm that allow them to overcome many financial and equipment shortfalls.

(S//SI) They are relatively advanced in FORNSAT collection and processing and, although they need equipment upgrades in the HF (High Frequency) arena, they have a very good analytic effort against Russian and Ukrainian HF networks. Furthermore, UZSI is particularly interested in developing exchanges with NSA on many technical issues and has not requested financial support from NSA.

(S//SI) FORNSAT antennas at Netreba

(S//SI) It was clear that UZSI's General Director instructed his subordinate leaders to fully brief the TDY team on the SIGINT Department's capabilities and missions. As a result, UZSI personnel essentially opened the door to their SIGINT vault. They were extremely forthright with information and physical access to their facilities. No questions were off-limits and they appeared to be perfectly candid in every response. With this exceptional degree of openness, the TDY team was able to meet all of its objectives. UZSI's senior leadership briefed them on UZSI's overall authorities, structure, missions, customer base and requirements process, while the SIGINT Department delivered very specific briefings and demonstrations.

(S//SI) The TDY team was extremely impressed with UZSI's SIGINT capabilities and by their willingness to partner with the United States. Moreover, an ongoing exchange of technical information between UZSI and SID's Counterintelligence (CI) and HUMINT Support Product Line clearly demonstrates UZSI's ability to fill niche roles within NSA target offices. According to Counterintelligence and HUMINT Support (S2D) senior analysts, UZSI personnel are exceptionally good at analysis of material associated with Russian CI targets. Presumably this expertise carries over to other targets. For that reason and based on their personal observations, the TDY team believes that expansion in the exchange of CI information would enhance NSA's ability to answer high-priority customer requirements and the team further believes that eight additional product lines and data acquisition organizations could also benefit from cooperation with the Czechs.

(S//SI) Well thought-out preparation and a high degree of cooperation among NSA offices, CIA, and the European Technical Center all but guaranteed the TDY team would return with the data needed by NSA leaders. CIA, ETC, Analysis & Production, Data Acquisition, and both the SID Operations Group and Technical Services Group in FAD were represented within the six-person TDY team, which also included experts in collection, signals analysis, IT systems, linguistics and organizational leadership. In addition to the excellent operational briefings presented by UZSI, the members enjoyed exceptional Czech cuisine and beverages while visiting one of the most beautiful countries in Europe!

(S//SI) The TDY team from I. to r., Chief of UZSI's Liaison Department), (Deputy

(U//FOUO) This article is reprinted from the March Foreign Affairs Digest

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