



## (U) MGQ's Notes from the Field - Part 2

FROM: MG Richard Quirk, USA  
SIGINT Director  
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(U) Hello again from Baghdad. The SIGINT Leadership Team has seen and heard a great deal over the past 48 hours, and I'm going to focus today's letter on the organizations and missions we have been exposed to thus far on this Friday morning.

(S//SI) In a wartime situation, conditions tend to change very rapidly, and it is important to constantly reconfirm or redefine our missions. On this trip, we are finding a US effort embroiled in change. Yesterday we visited the two new major commands in Iraq: the Multi National Force - Iraq (MNF-I) and the Multi National Corps - Iraq (MNC-I). MNF-I, under the command of General George Casey, is focusing on the establishment of elements of the Iraqi government, especially its security and military institutions.

(S//SI) It is an enormous job that is rooted in selecting, vetting, and training the right people from the Iraqi population to lead this country toward a free, democratic, and prosperous future. These are exceptionally difficult tasks for a people brought up within a despotic and oppressive regime. SIGINT can and must assist MNF-I in identifying emerging leaders suitable for the governing and defense of a free country that respects the rights of its citizens and those of its neighbors. We will also have to separate the good actors from the bad in practice, as we watch them execute their duties in this government.

(S//SI) MNF-I is also charged with the current security of the country. BG (P) John Defreitas, the senior intelligence officer, is focusing much of his effort and that of the Combined Intelligence Operations Center on identifying, tracking, and defeating the insurgents, former regime elements (FRE) and other internal and external entities that continue to threaten our US forces, Iraqi citizens, and the developing Iraqi nation-state in the long term, as well as now. Much of our focus across the SIGINT System will have to remain on the internal threat for now, but, increasingly, we must refocus on external relationships and the vetting of internal leaders of the future.

(S//SI) The largest element of MNF-I is MNC-I. Commanded by Lieutenant General John Vines, whose newly arrived XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters serves as its leadership element, MNC-I also includes the 2d Marine Expeditionary Force, 3d Infantry Division, 42d Infantry Division, Task Force Freedom (the Striker Brigade/11th Armored Cavalry Regiment Task Force), and our coalition partner units. Its mission is to conduct military operations to secure Iraq sufficiently to permit MNF-I and other elements of the US government and the coalition to assist in the standup of the Iraqi government. The MNC-I forces are distributed across much of Iraq, and are reducing the threat of insurgency and the intimidation to levels that the newly established Iraqi security forces can manage. In fact, they are gradually turning this mission over to the Iraqi security forces. Our cryptologic missions in this



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regard are aimed at detecting and targeting elements of the opposing forces in country, and assisting in protecting our forces, which are still sustaining casualties from enemy action.

(S//SI) In the realm of Force Protection, the number one killer of US and coalition troops in the improvised explosive device, or IED. We need to be sure that SIGINT is doing what it can to counter the IED threat as part of the Interagency Team working the IED problem.

(S//SI) In the business of detecting opposing forces in country, our Cryptologic mission continues to focus on identifying, tracking, and targeting these insurgent and FRE elements so that MNC-I forces can take these threats off the street. It became very clear today that the overwhelming priority in this regard is "AMZ", or Abu Musab al Zarqawi. I'll discuss his importance to the operations tomorrow; suffice it to say that his removal as a threat is the vital "next step" in building confidence in the citizenry and in making the streets safer for all.

(S//SI) It will also become more important over time to ensure we are doing all we can to support the coalition-aspect of these operations. For example: this morning, I met the commander of the South Korean Forces in Iraq, stationed in Irbil. He has a Korean tactical SIGINT unit supporting his operation, but they have had virtually no contact with our efforts. We will have an opportunity and a challenge here to develop better teamwork across all of the deployed tactical SIGINT units such as those of the Koreans. We are building the "Center Ice" communications network specifically to supply that kind of tactical SIGINT coalition on the ground.

(S//SI) Over time, this kind of mutual support will have to extend as well to the Iraqi SIGINT Element (ISE), if SIGINT is to help build stability in the country. We will want to imbue the ISE with all of the skills and ethics that should be demanded of a SIGINT Service in a democratic nation, especially one under internal and external threat. If we are to develop a lasting partnership with Iraq, we will need to assist in the training of that service, and open the doors of sharing fairly early in its development. Otherwise, the country will be forced to seek other partners, some of which might not favor democratic development. The clock is ticking on this relationship, even though establishing it is filled with challenges. In a broader sense, we will have to open dissemination of SIGINT, "SECRET REL IRAQ", much more widely in the future. As the MNF-I and the Ambassador continue to increase the role of Iraqi security forces in conducting operations, they will become much more dependent on good intelligence. We will have to aggressively identify opportunities to provide to them the intelligence they will need to successfully execute those operations that we would have previously had to conduct.

(U) Tomorrow, I plan to continue providing you with a sense of the needs of our very senior partners over here. Meanwhile, today you will probably see additional articles from other members of the team.

(U) Everywhere we went today, the most consistent theme was the profound gratitude of each of our customers and partners for your extraordinary accomplishments. This was not patronizing chatter. People over here do not have time for small talk or "feel good remarks". Too many lives hang in the balance, and the folks here know all too well their responsibility to win this conflict quickly and

to protect lives. No...these continue to be heartfelt thanks from very knowledgeable teammates. It has already been a great pleasure to receive the thanks that have truly been meant for all of you.

(U//FOUO) I guess my last remark is to note that this day has been a special pleasure because of all of the totally professional personnel we have met already on the trip. There have been too many to mention, but certainly [REDACTED] (CSG Baghdad) stood out today, as did [REDACTED] (MI Co, 4th Bde, 3ID at the "No Heads Palace"), [REDACTED] (S3), [REDACTED] (FAD), [REDACTED] (F6), and [REDACTED] (NCR-I Ofc Admin).

Keep up the great work!  
MG Q

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