



(S//SI) Cartoon Crisis: NSA Support to Danish Intelligence

FROM: [REDACTED]
FAD's Europe Office (DP11)
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(S//SI) SID provides the Danes with reporting related to the uproar over Prophet Mohammed cartoons.

(S//SI) The Director of the Danish Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS) sent a letter to DIRNSA on 7 February 2006 asking for a commitment from NSA, one they could show to their Oversight Committee, to assist DDIS/T (DDIS's Technical Sector) with NSA reporting on any indications of threats to their embassies, major commercial interests, and, of course, Danish citizens abroad. This request was prompted by the Muslim reaction to cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed printed in a Danish newspaper in September and the political need to show the Oversight Committee that DDIS is doing everything they can. DIRNSA replied promptly with a letter that stated that NSA would do everything we could, not limiting ourselves by sensitive sources.



*(U) Pakistani Sunni Muslims burn a Danish flag during a rally in Lahore, February 24, 2006
(Reuters)*

(S//SI) In fact, this support to DDIS/T began before the Danes ever made a request for help. Counterterrorism and the Foreign Affairs Directorate (FAD) stayed late on 26 January to release a report indicating this retaliation was going to happen. The first DDIS request came in via the communications circuit on 30 January and was followed up by a phone call on 3 February.

(S//SI) Although a plea went out through the Country Team for S2 to report anything they might see, reporting was slow to begin, as there just was no intercept. In fact, until the violence began over the weekend of 4-5 February, it appeared that international interest was limited. Over the next two weeks, reporting increased dramatically, as demonstrations and violence escalated. Several more letters were sent back and forth between DIRNSA and DDIS regarding the support NSA was supplying.

(S//SI) At the beginning of this crisis, DDIS/T began working 24/7. In response, SID's Partner Dissemination Cell (PDC - S12C3) beefed up their support, actively looking for ANY reporting relevant to the crisis. Members of the PDC came in on weekends and garnered support from NSOC* and the CT MMC*. NSOC began tipping FAD and the PDC with press and timely reporting. CTMMC was granted access to the communications link with DDIS/T, was instructed on the usage by the PDC, and began sending reports during non-daylight hours.

(S//SI) While some reporting was definitely off-limits, FAD was able to push some very sensitive, and quite important, reports through to the Danes. Respecting the sensitivity of these reports, the Danes handled them as hard copy and, maintained full accountability, and only provided them on a "read and return" basis to a very limited number of senior government officials.

(S//SI) As of 22 February, DDIS/T felt comfortable enough with the current crisis situation that they discontinued their watch. In response, NSA will do the same. The CT MMC will be requested to remain watchful after-hours to reporting on threats or potential threats and forward them accordingly.

(S//SI) While the response by NSA seemed slow to begin, everyone stepped up to the plate in the end and provided the Danish service with some good intelligence. Thanks goes out to all those who made this possible, especially the PDC, NSOC and the CT MMC.

*(U) Notes:

NSOC = National Security Operations Center

CT MMC = Counterterrorism Mission Management Center

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