



(S) Status of the China and Korea Mission Build-Out

FROM: ██████████
Global Capabilities Manager for China and Korea (S2B)
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(S//SI) When it comes to mission buildout of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and North Korean targets, we are already beginning to see a light at the end of the tunnel. In reality, the activities of the past year have been part of an evolution that began in the mid-90's when it was decided first, that the China military mission would transfer from NSAW to the Kunia RSOC*, then - in 1997 - that the Korea mission would follow suit. What the mission alignment and buildout initiative has allowed us to do is get both missions to a higher level of capability and empowerment, complete the unfinished business of the initial mission transfers, posture the Korean and China missions for success, and implement a global collaborative effort.

(S//SI) According to the plan (and, admittedly, with some luck), it won't be too long before the China and North Korea military missions in Hawaii are adequately resourced, and by the end of 2011, up to 100 more people will join the effort in Hawaii. Almost the entire North Korea military target set is already in Hawaii; it will be my first mission area to be completely delegated to a Cryptologic Center. The original plan was to complete mission alignment of PRC military targets in 2007, but that timeline is slipping. I'm watching that trend closely with NSAH (NSA/CSS Hawaii) SID leadership.

(S//SI) For me, from the perspective of the China and Korea missions, I'm already thinking beyond the numbers; the issue is not in the volumes. Let's face it; I had a 10-year head start on Counterterrorism (CT), GEO, Combating Proliferation (CP), Regional Targets, Weapons & Space and other missions in the works for NSA Hawaii. Also, in many respects, I have a less complex task than the other GCMs because I am focused only on Hawaii; I have no plan to assign and delegate mission to Georgia or Texas. My main challenge now is to chart a course and establish hiring goals that are consistent with the needs and priorities of my fellow GCM's.

(S//SI) On the one hand, I am driven by priorities: How can we, as a corporation, grow the CT mission and establish real CP and GEO capabilities in Hawaii as quickly as possible? What's the minimal number of people those missions need to reach a critical mass that will allow them to get down to business? On the other hand, there are practical considerations that compel us to strive for completing the buildout of the China and Korea missions as quickly as possible; we're so close! I have to find the right balance.

(S//SI) In addition to NSA Hawaii, we are also working hard to stand up a production capability at the Regional Language Center in Utah ([URLC](#)). My strategy is to start with a subset of the China civil mission while simultaneously beginning a talent search for high-caliber Korean linguists who could help us on the North Korean target. I'll state up front I am not opposed to expanding the

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missions at URLC to include reporting roles; in fact, that is my vision. But we will take it one step at a time, beginning with language analysis, transcription and translation and building from there, depending on the number of hires I can get and the skills of the work force in Utah.

(S//SI) I cannot implement mission buildout and alignment in a vacuum; there are many things going on in customer realms and real world that I must not ignore. The very nature of the nation's China strategy is rapidly evolving, for example, and we must be able to shift SIGINT analysis in response. PACOM's (US Pacific Command) strategic thinking is currently far beyond the context of planning for war with the PRC over Taiwan (CONPLAN 5077). Today, the emphasis is also on ways we can shape China (without a war!) into becoming the kind of nation we want and the world needs - turn it into a "responsible stakeholder" on the world stage. This approach will compel us to reexamine SIGINT priorities and explore changes in what we report, and how.

(S//SI) Much is changing in Korea, too! I cannot plan for success against the DPRK* without factoring in the role of the SIGINTers on the Peninsula. The linguists and analysts at SUSLAK (Special U.S. Liaison Advisor-Korea), in Osan and Pyongtaek have been essential in providing support to our warfighters in Korea for years; they are definitely a critical component of the calculus today. In recent years, much has been done in collaboration with USFK*, the SCEs* and our Korean partners, to improve the collection posture and communications architecture in Korea, adding a new flexibility and agility that has been heretofore unavailable to the SIGINT System. Initiatives like our HF Modernization program have done much to bring capabilities in Korea into the 21st Century, giving the SIGINT System an ability to collect more sophisticated HF signals. The challenge now is to optimize the new capabilities while working the mission more efficiently, to improve the quality of life for personnel serving in Korea, and strategize ways to take the Korean architecture to even higher levels.

(S//SI) One thing is clear: My end strength for the Korean mission will not increase; no one gets more people just because there is more collection available. In an effort to meet this challenge and to take advantage of other changes taking place in Korea (such as the Army's relocation from Seoul to Pyongtaek), I initiated a KOREA ROADMAP initiative. With representation from NSAW, NSAH, the Peninsula and the SCEs, this Korea Roadmap team is now investigating several potential courses of action. My plan is to roll out final recommendations to NSA senior leaders later this spring and summer.

(S//SI) In collaboration with NCPAC*, NCR* Korea, NSA Hawaii and the CSGs* in both Hawaii and Korea, we are taking every measure possible to make the Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOC) successful, and ensure that NSA performs critical value-adding functions within the new construct. One major initiative we are pursuing in this context is in the area of data sharing and access to NSA databases. We are now well into the process of giving personnel in the CSGs in Hawaii and Korea access to the databases they need to improve their support to US Forces Korea and PACOM commanders. Integrating these production capabilities into the work being done at NSA Hawaii and other production centers around the world will not be easy. It is, however, critical and necessary if we are to achieve mission success and become the kind of net-centric enterprise we envision.

(U) Notes:

RSOC = Regional Security Operations Center (old name for
Cryptologic Center)

DPRK = Democratic People's Republic of Korea

USFK = US Forces Korea

SCE = Service Cryptologic Elements

NCPAC = NSS/CSS Pacific

NCR = NSA/CSS Representative

CSGs = Cryptologic Services Groups

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