



(S//REL) Up For Consideration: Integrating Third Party Reps into NSA Facilities

FROM: SIGINT Communications (S02C)
and SIGINT Policy (S02L1)
Run Date: 07/24/2006

(S//REL) We've never in the past integrated Third Party employees into NSA workspaces at Fort Meade or in the field, but SID is now willing to consider the idea...

(S//REL) NSA's SIGINT relationships with other nations have been a remarkable success story. These interactions are perhaps more important today than ever before, in light of the continuing Global War on Terrorism and its varied and unpredictable demands on the SIGINT System. As part of this trend, our Third Party relationships have grown in importance in recent years, in many cases providing irreplaceable intelligence for our customers. The question arises: is it time to think about engaging even more closely with some of our Third Party allies than we have to-date?

(S//REL) One reason our *Second* Party partnerships have worked so well is that we have physically integrated representatives from other 5-EYES agencies into our spaces, and NSA representatives into theirs. While this practice has proved very successful, it nevertheless does come at the cost of adding complexity to our interactions with the rest of the US Intelligence Community, which does not enjoy the same kind of Second Party relationships that we SIGINTers do. For example, our primary classified networks are not fully integrated, because NSANet operates at the 5-EYES level, while Intelink (the standard for the rest of the IC) operates at the NOFORN level.

(S//REL) One potential way to get the most from our dealings with Third Parties would be to integrate their representatives, also, into NSA facilities -- something we have never done before. While this step would likely bring benefits for NSA, it also would carry certain costs and risks. (See an [article penned by Gary Grantham](#), Principal Director for Foreign Affairs, that discusses some of the obstacles involved.) **We are now willing to consider proposals to integrate Third Party representatives into our workspaces, but each proposal must be carefully weighed on its own merits from both mission imperative and cost/benefit perspectives.**

(S//REL) [SID Management Directive 419](#), " *Proposals for Third Party Integrees* " establishes the policy for consideration of requests to place Third Party integrees in National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) facilities for SIGINT mission purposes. This document applies to any SIGINT Directorate (SID) organization or Extended Enterprise USSS element that can make a mission case for the need to place a Third Party integree at an NSA/CSS facility, to include the Cryptologic Centers, Operations Centers, Technical Centers, Research Centers, or Collection Facilities, for SIGINT mission purposes.

(U//FOUO) To review SID Management Directive 419 in its entirety, visit the [SIGINT Policy home page](#) or follow this link: [Directive 419](#).

(U//FOUO) While we begin to explore the possibilities that Third Party integration would hold for the USSS, the new policy provides a deliberate and clear path for us to pursue such growth opportunities. If you have any questions about this new policy, please contact SIGINT Policy, DL SID_POLICY, [REDACTED].

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DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108