



(S//SI) Cutting Off the Flow of Sensitive Technology to Iran

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(TS//SI) SIGINT has kept certain missile-related technology out of Iran and provided important insights regarding Iran's nuclear program.

(S//SI) The Iranian government is making headlines around the world these days, with its pursuit of nuclear technology and its stated desire to destroy the state of Israel. As diplomats try to figure out ways to avoid another international crisis, the Intelligence Community is being called upon to help cut off the flow of sensitive technology to that adversarial nation. The Agency's Combating Proliferation (CP) elements are taking a leading role this effort, and have racked up a number of successes in recent months.



(U) Iranian clerics pray while holding pictures of Hizbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah during an anti-Israel demonstration in Tehran, August, 2006. (Reuters)

(TS//SI) As a very recent example, CP/Georgia reported that a U.S. company was shipping electronic components suitable for use in Iran's surface-to-air missile programs. Using that information, the Department of Commerce and US Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE - part of Homeland Security) jointly targeted the U.S. company and the carrier moving the goods. The operation paid off: Commerce was able to get the carrier to remove the goods from the aircraft just prior to takeoff, and as of 31 August, the goods were on their way back to the United States for redelivery to the U.S. company. This activity was highlighted as a major success story during the CP Interdiction VTC (31 August) that is hosted by the National Security Council.

(TS//SI) In another success story, a recent product disseminated by the CP/Missile Proliferation Branch (S2G22) showed that a [REDACTED] Company might be providing U.S.-origin electronics to a known Iranian front company associated with Iran's ballistic missile program. The report has provided the ICE Attaché and the State Department with additional leads. The good news on this is that [REDACTED] investigators have acted aggressively and made a series of arrests based on this information. Similarly, information from S2G22 and GS2G2 has allowed [REDACTED] officials to aggressively target a serial proliferator; the network has been disrupted and future arrests are possible.

(TS//SI) Finally, I would say the continued excellent analysis by all those elements in S2G working the Iranian nuclear program is contributing greatly to a wide array of efforts. Collection breakthroughs and increasingly detailed and descriptive reporting related to the critical nodes of the Iranian nuclear program are providing absolutely key and invaluable insights and informing the policy-making and interdiction community to a greater extent than ever.

(S//SI) In sum, SIGINT is closely watching the flow of advanced technology to Iran, and is helping to stop it!



(U) Iranian President Ahmadinejad speaks with Iranian Defense Minister Mohammadnajar in Tehran. (Reuters)

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