



(U//FOUO) Operation SIGINT - The Next Chapter

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(U//FOUO) The OpSIGINT organization is disbanding, with its function dispersed to SIGINT elements everywhere.

(U//FOUO) Over the past five years, Operation SIGINT (OpSIGINT) has teamed with a wide range of Intelligence Community (IC), United States SIGINT System (USSS), and foreign partners to address some of the USSS's toughest challenges, all in an effort to make "Better SIGINT Now." Whether seeking new and innovative ways of accessing targets or looking to advance collaboration among diverse intelligence and SIGINT groups, "OpSIGINT" has served as a catalyst to help improve our SIGINT collection, analysis, and customer interaction.

(S//SI) While each OpSIGINT "target task force" has helped push the USSS to view problems and solutions in a new light, SID leadership has now embarked on a new chapter to instill the spirit, creativity and practices of OpSIGINT across the USSS. For the USSS to reach its goal of being a global, net-centric information enterprise, OpSIGINT must be institutionalized across the USSS, not just at NSA Washington. To that end, OpSIGINT's goals will be incorporated into all SIGINT operations across the globe, allowing SIGINT analysts everywhere to collaborate at will.

(U//FOUO) With SID Senior Leadership's decision to disband the OpSIGINT organization, it is time to thank all those who have contributed to this historical moment and to reflect on their accomplishments. For the past five plus years, OpSIGINT, coupled with respective SIGINT line organizations, has lead the way on the following successes:

- (TS//SI) Developing a new Intelink reporting vehicle, SCORPIOFORE, for the sharing of Iranian nuclear-related SIGINT with customers, which has also now spread to other target areas;
- (TS//SI) Expanding access and increasing reporting against Chinese leadership;
- (S//SI) Developing social networks and an improved ability to exploit the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia);
- (TS//SI) Increasing target knowledge and the ability to track members of the Al-Haramain terrorist group;
- (TS//SI) Enabling the first successful computer network exploitation attack against Russian organized crime targets;
- (S) Working closely with the Iraq Issue Manager Team (SID's first IMT) during the Iraq Campaign Planning Phase. Ensured a coordinated SID effort and established and maintained the "go iraq" website which served as the information space for the campaign;
- (S) Establishing a database to house HUMINT information from Iraq which greatly aided SIGDEV against Iraq-related targets
- (TS//SI) Creating a Digital Network Intelligence Working Group for those involved in the North Korean Weapons of Mass Destruction effort, resulting in increased access and improved collaboration;
- (TS//SI) Leading a team which provided SIGINT support to the six-party talks with North Korea (NK) and forming a working group whose efforts led to improved collection against

NK leadership communications;

- (U//FOUO) Establishing a formal framework upon which an ODNI- and DoD-mandated SID Lessons Learned Program would be built;
- (S) Promoting greater information sharing and collaboration regarding the Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) terrorism target, including advances in tool training, knowledge management, virtual teaming practices, and CBRN education across the enterprise as well as improved interactions with Intelligence Community partners.

(U//FOUO) The OPSIGINT methodology has brought people together from across the USSS and showed us how to apply business rigor to our missions while encouraging us to develop creative approaches to address vexing SIGINT problems. The members who have been a part of OPSIGINT have taken these practices with them making the USSS better because of it. We thank those who have been a part of OPSIGINT era . While the current OPSIGINT structure is ending, the philosophy of striving to find better solutions to our ever-increasing challenges lives on.

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