



(S//SI//REL) North Korea SIGINT Assessment Report Pays Off

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(S//SI//REL) Fellow analysts: recent articles from SID leadership have encouraged reporting shops to publish comprehensive SIGINT assessment reports, because our customers find them very useful ¹. The tremendous customer response to a recent Hawaii SID assessment report regarding North Korean military activity demonstrates just how worthwhile such an effort can be.

(S//SI//REL) The Korean People's Army assumed a heightened alert status due to the "tense situation" following North Korea's launch of seven missiles in early July and the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1695 ² condemning the launches. North Korean Leader Kim Cho'ng-il issued a Supreme Commander's Order (SCO) ³ dated 19 July calling for the military to mobilize, probably initiating the beginning of transition to a "semi-war" status.

(S//SI//REL) The NSA/CSS Hawaii Signals Intelligence Directorate (HSID) [North Korea Military Operations Department \(HS2B4\)](#) **stood up an analysis and reporting team with each department executing hundreds of man-hours of research and analysis.** This effort culminated in HS2B4 releasing a detailed SIGINT assessment ⁴ in early August 2006 on North Korean military activity alerting the Intelligence Community and national-level decision-makers to North Korea's heightened alert posture and mobilization preparations. The assessment provided the political background leading up to the situation, gave an in-depth look at the current alert and mobilization activity, and put it in historical perspective based on previous instances of an increased alert state in North Korea.

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(TS//SI//REL) On 2 and 3 August, HS2B4 issued two CAT III reports ⁵ generated from the prosecution of North Korean Naval communications that provided unique insight into national mobilization orders issued in North Korea. These reports were utilized by national-level and peninsula organizations to begin monitoring the situation in North Korea and were the first significant indication to the intelligence community that North Korea was gearing up its alert posture.

(S//SI//REL) Consumer response to the assessment report was overwhelmingly positive with analysts and executives from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Pacific Command Joint Intelligence Operations Center (PACOM JIOC), United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM) J2, United States Forces Command Korea (USFK) J2 responding with feedback and thanks for a job well done. Senior analysts across the Intelligence Community lauded the report as one of the finest NSA products ever produced on the North Korean military target.

(S//SI//REL) The report quickly became the basis for numerous SIGINT and all-source products and briefings for:

- the White House,
- Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Executive Highlight and Briefing slide,
- SIGINT National Intelligence Officer (SINIO) Special Warning Notice,
- NSOC DIR standup,
- Department of State Intelligence and Research special report,
- PACOM JIOC products and Briefings, and
- USFK J2 products and Briefings.

(S//SI//REL) **Based on our positive experience, we encourage other reporting organizations to consider investing the time and resources into writing assessment reports as well** -- clearly, customers value this type of product very highly!

(U) Notes:

¹ (U//FOUO) For example, see the earlier article [Early Results Look Good: Assessment Report Update](#)

² (U) U.N. Security Council Resolution 1695 was unanimously adopted on 15 July 2006 during the Security Council, 5490th meeting. Resolution 1695 "urges Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return immediately to Six-Party Talks without precondition, condemns missile launches, demands that the North-East Asian country suspend all ballistic missile related activity and reinstate its moratorium on missile launches."

³ (U//FOUO) Supreme Commander's Order - for additional information, refer to 2/F2/4923-06 DTG 150352Z AUG 06

⁴ (U//FOUO) On Intelink, see the [entire SIGINT assessment](#), and the [follow-up 1](#) to the original assessment report.

⁵ (U//FOUO) To view the two Cat III reports, see (on Intelink):

- (TS//SI//REL) [North Korea/Naval Activity: 9th Naval Command Receives Combat Mobilization Instructions, 22 July 2006](#)
- (TS//SI//REL) [North Korea/Naval Activity: 9th Naval Command Receives Continuation of Combat Mobilization Orders, 22 July 2006](#)

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